I’ve been to two events in the past two weeks which have started me thinking harder about the way we protect and measure our enterprise systems.
The first of the two events was the fourth Splunk Live in St. Paul’s, London last week. I’ve been a big fan of Splunk for a few years but I’ve never really tried it out in production. The second was InfoSec at Earl’s Court. More about that one later.
What is Splunk?
To be honest, splunk is different things to different people. Since inception it’s had great value as a log collation and event alerting tool for systems administrators as that was what it was originally designed to do. However as both DJ Skillman and Godfrey Sullivan pointed out, Splunk has grown into a lot more than that. It solved a lot of “Big Data” (how I hate that phrase) problems before Big Data was trendy, taking arbitrary unstructured data sources structuring them in useful ways, indexing the hell out of them and adding friendly, near-real-time reporting and alerting on top. Nowadays, given the right data sources, Splunk is capable of providing across-the-board Operational Intelligence, yielding tremendous opportunities in measuring value of processes and events.
How does it work?
In order to make the most out of a Splunk installation you require at least three basic things :-
A data source – anything from a basic syslog or Apache web server log to a live high level ERP logistics event feed or even entire code commits
An enrichment process – something to tag packets, essentially to assign value to indexed fields, allowing the association of fields from different feeds, e.g. tallying new orders with a customer database with stock keeping perhaps.
A report – a canned report, presented on a dashboard for your CFO for example, or an email alert to tell your IT manager that someone squirting 5 day experiments in at the head of the analysis pipeline is going to go over-budget on your AWS analysis pipeline in three days’ time.
How far can you go with it?
Well, here’s a few of the pick ‘n’ mix selection of things I’d like to start indexing as soon as we sort out a) the restricted data limits of our so-far-free Splunk installation and b) what’s legal to do
ERP logs (supply chain, logistics, stock control, manufacturing lead times)
CRM + online store logs (customer info, helpdesk cases, orders)
anything and everything else with vaguely any business value
I think it’s pretty obvious that all this stuff taken together constitutes what most people call Big Data these days. There’s quite a distinction between that sort of mixed relational data and the plainer “lots of data” I deal with day to day, experimental data in the order of a terabyte-plus per device per day.
In this post I’d like to explain how it’s possible to integrate SVN (Subversion) source control using WebDAV and HTTPS using Apache and Active Directory to provide authentication and access control.
It’s generally accepted that SVN over WebDAV/HTTPS provides finer granulation security controls than SVN+SSH. The problem is that SVN+SSH is really easy to set up, requiring knowledge of svnadmin and the filesystem and very little else but WebDAV+HTTPS requires knowledge of Apache and its modules relating to WebDAV, authentication and authorisation which is quite a lot more to ask. Add to that authenticating to AD and you have yourself a lovely string of delicate single point of failure components. Ho-hum, not a huge amount you can do about that but at least the Apache components are pretty robust.
For this article I’m using CentOS but everything should be transferrable to any distribution with a little tweakage.
Firstly then, pick a disk or volume with plenty of space, we’re using make your repository – same as you would for svn+ssh:
svnadmin create /var/svn/repos
Install the prerequisite Apache modules:
yum install mod_dav_svn
This should also install mod_authz_svn which we’ll also be making use of. Both should end up in Apache’s module directory, in this case /etc/httpd/modules/
Download and install mod_authnz_external from its Google Code page. This allows Apache basic authentication to hook into an external authentication mechanism. mod_authnz_external.so should end up in Apache’s module directory but in my case it ended up in its default location of /usr/lib/httpd/modules/.
Download and install the companion pwauth utility from its Google Code page. In my case it installs to /usr/local/sbin/pwauth and needs suexec permissions (granted using chmod +s).
Join the machine to the domain – you’ll need an account with domain admin credentials to do this:
net ads join -U administrator
Check the join is behaving ok:
[root@svn conf]# net ads info
LDAP server: 192.168.100.10
LDAP server name: ad00.example.com
Bind Path: dc=EXAMPLE,dc=COM
LDAP port: 389
Server time: Tue, 15 May 2012 22:44:34 BST
KDC server: 192.168.100.10
Server time offset: 130
(Re)start winbind to pick up the new configuration:
service winbind restart
PAM & nsswitch.conf
PAM needs to know where to pull its information from, so we tell it about the new winbind service in /etc/pam.d/system-auth.
# This file is auto-generated.
# User changes will be destroyed the next time authconfig is run.
auth required pam_env.so
auth sufficient pam_unix.so nullok try_first_pass
auth requisite pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 500 quiet
auth sufficient pam_winbind.so try_first_pass
auth required pam_deny.so
account required pam_unix.so broken_shadow
account sufficient pam_localuser.so
account sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid < 500 quiet
account [default=bad success=ok user_unknown=ignore] pam_winbind.so
account required pam_permit.so
password requisite pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3
password sufficient pam_unix.so md5 shadow nullok try_first_pass use_authtok
password sufficient pam_winbind.so use_authtok
password required pam_deny.so
session optional pam_keyinit.so revoke
session required pam_limits.so
session [success=1 default=ignore] pam_succeed_if.so service in crond quiet use_uid
session required /lib/security/pam_mkhomedir.so
session required pam_unix.so
session optional pam_winbind.so
YMMV with PAM. It can take quite a lot of fiddling around to make it work perfectly. This obviously has an extremely close correlation to how flaky users find the authentication service. If you’re running on 64-bit you may find you need to install 64-bit versions of pam modules, e.g. mkhomedir which aren’t installed by default.
We also modify nsswitch.conf to tell other, non-pam aspects of the system where to pull information from:
To check the authentication information is coming back correctly you can use wbinfo but I like seeing data by using getent group or getent passwd. The output of these two commands will contain domain accounts if things are working correctly and only local system accounts otherwise.
We’re actually going to use system accounts for authentication. To stop people continuing to use svn+ssh (and thus bypassing the authorisation controls) we edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config and use AllowUsers or AllowGroups and specify all permitted users. Using AllowGroups will also provide AD group control of permitted logins but as the list is small it’s probably overkill. My sshd_config list looks a lot like this:
AllowUsers root rmp contractor itadmin
To test external authentication run /usr/local/sbin/pwauth as below. “yay” should be displayed if things are working ok. Note the password here is displayed in clear-text:
/etc/httpd/authz_svn.conf is the only part which should require any modifications over time – the access controls specify who is allowed to read and/or write to each svn project, in fact as everything’s a URL now you can arbitrarily restrict subfolders of projects too but that’s a little OTT. It can be arbitrarily extended and can take local and active directory usernames. I’m sure mod_authz_svn has full documentation about what you can and can’t put in here.
# Allow anonymous read access to everything by default.
* = r
rmp = rw
rmp = rw
bob = rw
So far that’s all the basic components. The last piece in the puzzle is enabling SSL for Apache. I use the following /etc/httpd/httpd.conf:
You’ll need to build yourself a certificate, self-signed if necessary, but that’s a whole other post. I recommend searching the web for “openssl self signed certificate” and you should find what you need. The above httpd.conf references the key and certificate under /etc/httpd/conf/svn.key and /etc/httpd/conf/svn.crt respectively.
The mod_authnz_external+pwauth combination can be avoided if you can persuade mod_authz_ldap to play nicely. There are a few different ldap modules around on the intertubes and after a lot of trial and even more error I couldn’t make any of them work reliably if at all.
And if all this leaves you feeling pretty nauseous it’s quite natural. To remedy this, go use git instead.
I receive four or five of these sorts of phishing emails a week so I thought I’d take a quick look at one and see how it’s put together.
Firstly a poorly constructed message from my- or more often someone else’s bank/tax office. Note capitalisation, lack of whitespace after fullstop in the first sentence, no currency denomination (e.g. £) for the amount but a realistic sum of money, definitely not $10,000,000 from the office of former attorney general Utoula of Lagos. Also note the threat of a deadline, even though none is stated.
we have reviewed your tax return and our calculations of your last years accounts a tax refund of 178.25 is due.Please submit the tax refund request and allow us 3-6 days in order to process it.
A refund can be delayed for a variety of reasons.
For example submitting invalid records or applying after the deadline.
Submit the form attached to your email in order to verify your card.
with an attachment: return_form.html . Who sends a plain text email with an attached HTML file? Nobody except scammers, that’s who. Saving out return_form.html (without the .html extension, for safety) and having a look I found this at the top:
(I’ve cut out the middle section because it’s long and I’m only interested in the techniques.)
The decoded page contains an HTML form requesting name, email address, physical address, card number, mother’s maiden name, phone number, national insurance number and bank account details where refund payment is to be made, including CVV. It posts all that delicious data over to … woah hold on, that’s not the HMRC is it?
188.8.131.52.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer net-188-219-154-228.cust.dsl.vodafone.it.
An Italian Vodafone DSL customer, probably a hacked home PC, most likely part of a botnet infected by a virus of some sort.
Let’s try poking the service:
Connecting to 184.108.40.206:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 Found
Location: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk [following]
ok, that was a GET request and the script expects a POST, but it still bounces us straight out to hrmc.gov.uk, presumably logging whatever data was sent back in a database or IRC channel somewhere whilst leaving the unsuspecting user none the wiser.
What about running services? Ok, let’s use nmap:
nmap -PN 220.127.116.11
Starting Nmap 5.51 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2011-10-25 13:44 BST
Nmap scan report for net-188-219-154-228.cust.dsl.vodafone.it (18.104.22.168)
Host is up (0.10s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
1027/tcp open IIS
1244/tcp open isbconference1
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
1720/tcp filtered H.323/Q.931
3306/tcp open mysql
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.69 seconds
So it’s running a few bits and pieces, things you wouldn’t normally open up given the choice..
wget -O- -q http://22.214.171.124/ | grep -i title
WAMP is a LAMP software stack built for Windows consisting of Apache, MySQL and PHP which explains some of the services this thing is running.
Here I paused and went back to look at the message headers.
Return-Path: < hmrc @return.co.uk>
< snip >
Received: from User ([126.96.36.199]) by smtp.direktora.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);
Tue, 25 Oct 2011 15:54:42 +0400
From: "HMRC"< hmrc @return.co.uk>
Subject: ***SPAM*** We have reviewed your tax return
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 07:54:42 -0400
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
Message-ID: < maindclqgdyxsvvr0ws0000024a @smtp.direktora.ru>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 25 Oct 2011 11:54:42.0679 (UTC) FILETIME=[E1F60870:01CC930C]
A few things to highlight here – firsly the return address is return.co.uk (probably fictitious) not hmrc.gov.uk, as doing so could generate a large number of bounced messages sent back to HMRC and alerting them that there’s a phisher out there. Not that they can really do anything about it beyond cyber-investigation, but always good to keep things on the QT.
Ignoring the fact that my MTA has flagged the subject as SPAM, the original SMTP server shows up as smtp.direktora.ru . Riiight, a UK Tax email sent through a mail server in Russia.
Back to the spam detection. The headers injected by my MTA look like this:
Good. Forged Mail User Agent, which isn’t something you might easily spot visually, and blacklisted in spamcop to boot.
Conclusions? Firstly don’t open attachments from untrusted sources. Duh, like I needed to tell you that. Secondly this is a UK-targetted scam, hosted on an Italian computer (probably) originating from Russia. Thisstuffisreal…